We focus on crowd-powered ltering, i.e., ltering a large set of items using humans. Filtering is one of the most commonly used building blocks in crowdsourcing applications and systems. While solutions for crowd-powered ltering exist, they make a range of implicit assumptions and restrictions, ultimately rendering them not powerful enough for real-world applications. We describe two approaches to discard these implicit assumptions and restrictions: one, that carefully generalizes prior work, leading to an optimal, but o entimes intractable solution, and another, that provides a novel way of reasoning about ltering strategies, leading to a sometimes suboptimal, but e ciently computable solution (that is asymptotically close to optimal). We demonstrate that our techniques lead to signi cant reductions in error of up to for xed cost over prior work in a novel crowdsourcing application: peer evaluation in online courses.
INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourcing, i.e., using input from human workers to solve problems, has emerged as a powerful mechanism for processing data, especially unstructured data, such as images, videos, and text. Over the past few years, there has been a development of algorithms that use humans for a range of data processing tasks, including sort- ese algorithms typically o er guarantees on some combination of accuracy, latency, and monetary cost (i.e., total compensation to human workers).
Of these tasks, perhaps the most commonly used data processing task is ltering, i.e., using humans to evaluate or rate items such as images, videos, or text. For instance, ltering is used for content moderation [ ], i.e., deciding if each image in a dataset is appropriate to be viewed by a general audience, by having multiple humans evaluate each image. In addition to content moderation, ltering is used in spam identi cation [ ], relevance estimation [ ], text classi cation [ , ] , and video analysis [ ]. Filtering also forms a fundamental relational operator in declarative crowdsourcing systems [ , ] .
Our previous work on ltering, titled CrowdScreen [ ], provides a state representation that enables us to reason about and store l- tering strategies for a simple setting: ltering a set of equally di cult items (with no prior knowledge on items) using a in nite pool of independent and identical workers with equal costs (i.e., the workers need to be paid the same amount). Under those assumptions, the designed strategies have guarantees on expected cost and accuracy (and no guarantees on latency).
While CrowdScreen provides a good starting point for ltering, due to the many implicit assumptions and restrictions, it is ultimately not powerful enough for real-world ltering applications. In this paper, we describe techniques that enable us to remove many of the assumptions and restrictions in CrowdScreen. Overall, our techniques can inform the design of a general and powerful ltering operator that we believe can be applied to any real-world scenario.
Our approach is the following: we rst recast the new variants of ltering (on removing simplifying assumptions and restrictions one by one) into generalizations of the representation in CrowdScreen. While this step in itself is not hard, our main challenge here is to ensure that we preserve the desirable linearity properties that allow us to use e cient optimization techniques.
However, an even bigger challenge arises while incorporating many of the new variations: the representation itself becomes intractable to store. For instance, when incorporating distinct worker abilities (instead of assuming that all workers have identical accuracies), the representation scales exponentially in the number of workers. us, the optimization problems becomes even more complex and time consuming. To combat this challenge for the troublesome variations, we devise a novel state representation that reduces the amount of information stored and enables us to nd strategies that are approximate, but provably close to optimal asymptotically.
To describe both these representations (the recasting of the CrowdScreen representation, as well as the entirely new compressed representation), we focus on two important variations not considered by CrowdScreen: distinct worker abilities and prior information.
• Distinct worker abilities: CrowdScreen assumes that all human workers have the same error rates -all workers are equally capable of answering questions. is assumption is certainly not true in practice: there are some workers that are much better than others, possibly because they do a more careful job or are more competent.
• Prior information:
e CrowdScreen algorithms assume that we have no information about any of the items to begin with; however, there may be cases where we have "prior information"-that is, knowledge that some items are more likely to pass the lter than others.
is prior information may originate from an automated algorithm, such as a machine learning algorithm, that outputs probabilities for whether each item is likely to pass the lter or not. We therefore come up with a principled way to combine machine-and human-computation, so that we expense human cycles on the items that are hard to judge automatically. e entire list of variations or aspects we consider can be found in Table in Section (we do not expect the reader to fully understand  the table at this point) , along with brief explanations. We do not describe in detail the other aspects due to space limitations, however, they may be all found in our extended technical report [ ]. Novel Application: To ground our discussion, we evaluate our techniques on a novel real-world application that, to our knowledge, has not been studied in the context of crowd algorithms, peer evaluation in online courses.
MOOCs (Massive Open Online Courses) [ ] are revolutionizing education. ere are hundreds of courses being o ered by organizations such as Coursera [ ], Udacity [ ], and EdX [ ], and each of these courses are being taken by thousands of students worldwide [ ]. Evaluating students in many of these MOOCs (especially courses in the humanities) requires human expertise: for instance, it is impossible to grade an essay, a so ware project, or a mathematical proof completely automatically.
Given that thousands of students are taking these courses, the MOOC providers have turned to peer evaluation, i.e., having students evaluate each other's work, as the primary mechanism for grading in these problematic courses. Peer evaluation is a large scale application of crowd-powered ltering: for each student submission, the peer evaluation system needs to decide how many graders would need to evaluate that submission in order to correctly determine the true grade. Student graders may make mistakes while evaluating submissions, and therefore, we may need multiple student graders to evaluate each submission. Since student grader time is a limited resource, we would rather have graders evaluate student submissions for which there is more uncertainty regarding the true grade, instead of submissions for which the true grade is fairly certain.
We demonstrate that the techniques described in this paper are useful for peer evaluation: they provide signi cantly higher quality results than standard heuristics currently in use in the peer evaluation system in the MOOC platform Coursera [ ], as well as algorithms in CrowdScreen, which ignore a number of key factors, and are therefore not as useful. Overall, we get reductions of upto in error for xed cost, a sizable improvement in performance. Contributions: Here is the outline for the paper:
• We describe the answer-record representation, a way to represent and reason about ltering strategies. is representation is a straightforward extension of the representation in CrowdScreen. is representation provides the optimal solution to all the aspects we consider, but can be expensive to compute in some cases (Section ).
• We describe our solution for distinct worker abilities (Section . ).
• We provide the key ideas for incorporating prior information (Section . ).
• We describe the posterior-based representation, a new way of representing and reasoning about strategies. is representation leads to an e cient but approximate solution to all the aspects we consider (Section ).
• We describe the representation for the basic setting considered in CrowdScreen, and show that the expected cost of the optimal strategy in this representation converges (on increasing a userspeci ed parameter without bound) to the cost of the optimal strategy in the answer-record representation (Section . ).
• We describe our solution using this representation for distinct worker abilities (Section . ).
• We provide the key ideas for using the posterior-based representation when incorporating prior information (Section . ).
• We discuss other aspects and demonstrate that our representations are general enough to incorporate all the new variations (Section ).
• We evaluate our algorithms on real MOOC data, demonstrating that we get a signi cant reduction of up to in error (for same cost) by using our techniques over techniques in CrowdScreen, as well as other techniques and heuristics currently used in the peer evaluation system (Section ).
• We describe related work (Section ), and conclude (Section ).
PRELIMINARIES
We begin by describing the basic setup from CrowdScreen, but when taking into consideration distinct worker abilities. e other aspects mentioned in the introduction will be described later on.
We are given a set of items I, where I = n. A random variable V controls whether an input item satis es the lter (V = ) or not (V = ). e selectivity of our lter, s, gives us the probability that V = (over all possible items).
We assume that there is no automated mechanism to examine an item and determine for certain whether that item satis es the lter or not. e only type of action we can perform on an item is to ask a speci c human worker wi , i ∈ . . . r a question. e worker can tell us YES (meaning that they think the item satis es the lter) or NO.
e worker wi can make mistakes, and in particular:
• e false positive rate is: Pr[wi 's answer is YES V = ] = e (wi )
• e false negative rate is: Pr[wi 's answer is NO V = ] = e (wi ) e error rates e (wi ), e (wi ) are estimated either by evaluating worker wi on questions with known correct answers, or by using prior history on worker performance. In peer evaluation, error rates are estimated by having workers (in this case, graders) evaluate a few "test" submissions that the course instructors have also graded. e selectivity s is estimated by having course instructors evaluate a small sample of submissions.
Overall, there may be some workers who are less error-prone at answering questions than others, possibly because they are more diligent or more capable. We can ask di erent humans the same question to get better accuracy, and we assume that their errors are independent. (We relax this restriction in Section .) However, if we ask the same human the question on the same item, we will get the same answer. erefore, we will ask the question on a given item to a given human at most once.
A strategy F is a computer procedure that takes as input one item, asks one or more humans questions on that item, and eventually outputs either Pass or Fail for that item. A Pass output represents a belief that the item satis es the lter, while Fail represents the opposite. We de ne an algorithm to be a procedure that, given parameters and constraints, generates a strategy.
ANSWER-RECORD REPRESENTATION
In this section, we describe our rst representation for worker abilities. We will then discuss how we may incorporate prior information. For the latter, we may have a machine learning algorithm (say a classi er) that analyzes items and assigns probabilities of passing the lter to each item. As an example, if we were doing content moderation of images, there are automated algorithms that analyze each image (perhaps by using the distribution of colors or by looking for speci c patterns) and provide a probability for whether the image is likely to be inappropriate for a general audience.
Setting with Worker Abilities
Representation: Since humans may have di erent error rates, the state of processing for an item a er some questions are asked can be completely represented using a state variable S = (x , y , x , y , . . . , xr , yr), where xi is an indicator variable indicating whether worker wi answered YES for the question on the item, and yi indicates if worker wi answered NO for the question on the item. If xi = yi = , then wi has not been asked a question yet on the item; if xi = , yi = , then wi has been asked a question and has answered YES; and if xi = , yi = , then wi has been asked a question on the item and has answered NO. e case where xi = yi = can never arise.
Note that the reason why the state variable S is a complete description of the state of processing is that the order in which the answers are provided by humans is not critical for making a decision on an item; only the set of YES/NO answers is important, and the identity of the workers who provided the answers. erefore, the state variable S captures all the relevant information about an item that is necessary for a strategy to maintain. In CrowdScreen, S was simply the count of the YES and NO answers.
is information was sufcient because all workers were assumed to be equally error-prone in that setting, and therefore, the identity of the worker who gave a speci c answer was not important.
We therefore call this representation the Answer Record Representation (i.e., the state or processing is the complete set of answers).
At a given state S, a strategy F probabilistically does one of the following: (a) stop executing, and return Pass on the item, (b) stop executing, and return Fail on the item, or (c) continue executing (Cont), i.e., ask an additional question for that item. Notice that, we are overloading our use of the term "strategy" to mean two things: (a) the code that operates on an item, and eventually returns Pass or Fail, (b) a decision function, de ned over all reachable states, that takes as input a state S, and outputs a decision for that state (Pass, Fail, Cont) . e use will be clear from the context. us, at a given state S, the strategy returns Pass, i.e., F(S) = Pass, with probability apass(S), returns Fail, i.e., F(S) = Fail with probability a f ai l (S), and will ask another human a question on that item, F(S) = Cont with probability acont(S) = − apass(S) − a f ai l (S). If either Pass or Fail returned at a state, we say that the strategy terminates. If Cont is returned at a state, then an answer is requested from one of the unasked human workers-those for whom xi = yi = , all with equal probability. us, in this scenario, we do not control which human worker answers our question-this scenario is relevant in marketplaces like Mechanical Turk, or even in peer evaluation, where we do not control who is online and available for grading at a given time. In some real world applications, we may be able to control which worker is asked to answer the question; this aspect is covered in Section . Due to the properties described above, strategies are instances of the well-studied discrete Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) [ ]. MDPs are represented by a set of states (here, all possible S), possible decisions for each state (here, Pass, Fail, Cont), and a probability distribution over next states when a decision is taken at a given state. MDPs have a single reward function (or metric) associated with each state. In our case, since we are considering multiple metrics-cost and accuracy-we cannot use the standard value and policy iteration techniques that are meant for optimizing single metrics in MDPs. Instead, we must rely on linear programming. We emphasize that our key contribution is not in the solution but in reducing our scenario to the MDP formalism, while maintaining computational e ciency. To enable our paper to be self-contained for a database audience, we describe our approach without using the MDP formalism.
Metrics:
To determine which strategy is best, we study the metrics of error and cost. We start by de ning two quantities, given a strategy:
• p (S) is the probability that the strategy reaches state S and the item satis es the lter (V = ); and • p (S) is the probability that the strategy reaches state S and the item does not satisfy the lter (V = ). We can now de ne the following metrics:
• E is the sum of expected errors across all states. e expected error at a state S is simply the probability that the strategy terminated at S with an error being made.
• C is the sum of expected cost across all states. e cost at a state S is the probability that the state was reached, i.e., (p (S)+p (S)), multiplied by the probability that a termination decision was taken, i.e., (apass(S) + a f ai l (S)), multiplied by the cost, i.e., the total number of answers so far:
e probabilities p and p can be iteratively computed; we illustrate this using a simple example with r = workers for p (also displayed in Figure (a) ). Consider state S = ( , , , ) (i.e., worker w answered YES and w answered NO). e gure shows that we can get to state S from either S = ( , , , ) by receiving a YES from w , or from S = ( , , , ) by receiving a NO from w . en, p (S ) is the sum of two quantities: the rst quantity is the probability that the strategy reached S via S , and the second quantity is the probability that the strategy reached S via S , both when the item does not satisfy the lter. ere are no other ways to get to S . e rst quantity is equal to p (S ) ⋅ acont(S ) ⋅ e (w ), where • p (S ) is the probability that the strategy reached S and the item does not satisfy the lter (V = ), • acont(S ) is the probability that an additional human worker was asked (the only unasked worker at S is w , so w was asked to answer), • and e (w ) is the probability that w answered incorrectly. e second quantity is similar. us,
In the general case, we have the following equations:
where b is the number of xi or yi that are , i.e., the number of workers who have not been asked yet at state R. us, we simply sum up the probabilities that the strategy reaches (x , y , . . . , xi− , yi− , , , . . . , xn , yn) and gets a YES from a speci c worker wi (out of b unasked workers) who has not been asked before, for all i. And we add this sum to the probabilities that the strategy reaches (x , y , . . . , xi− , yi− , , , . . . , xn , yn) and gets a NO from a speci c worker wi (out of b) who has not been asked before, for all i.
erefore, the probability of getting to a state S (and the item not satisfying the lter) is the sum of the probabilities of getting to one of the previous states R that is identical to S but has one xi or yi diminished by (with the item not satisfying the lter), and getting the appropriate answer (YES/NO) from the appropriate worker i. (Naturally, the states R that are invalid are omitted from the summation.)
For a strategy, we de ne the states S for which p or p are nonzero as reachable states (that is, there is a non-zero probability of reaching them while executing a strategy.) Problem: Given parameters selectivity s, false negative rates e (wi ), and false positive rates e (wi ), we consider the following problem:
Given an error threshold τ and a budget threshold per item m, nd a strategy that minimizes C such that E < τ and ∀ reachable (x , y , . . . , xr , yr) ∶ ∑ i∈ ...r (xi + yi ) ≤ m Since we want to ensure that the strategy terminates, we enforce a threshold m on the maximum number of questions we can ask for any item (which is nothing but a maximum budget for any item that we want to lter). In our peer evaluation setting, the problem above translates to a minimization of the average number of evaluations assuming a threshold on error rate, a maximum number of graders per submission and knowledge of per-worker error rates. Solution Intuition: We present a solution to Problem that generalizes the solution in CrowdScreen, but is simpler to understand. Our solution leverages linear programming.
Even though the equations describing relationships between variables are highly non-linear (ref. Equation , ), we can convert these into linear equations by considering the ow of paths. A path is a speci c sequence of answers that can be used to get to a given state S. Returning to our previous example ( Figure ) , one path to get to S may be w answering YES rst, followed by w answering NO.
e only other possible path is for w to answer NO followed by w answering YES. ese paths are depicted in Figure (a); the only way to get from ( , , , ) to ( , , , ) is via one of these two paths. Of course, not all paths may be possible in a strategy. at is, it may be possible that a strategy stops and returns Fail when w answers NO, and therefore, the latter path is not feasible.
We de ne a new variable called path(S) to denote the number of paths from the origin ( , . . . , ) to S within a strategy. In our example above, assume the strategy always continues asking questions at ( , , , ), ( , , , ), and ( , , , ) (that is, acont = for all of these points). en path(S ) is , since both paths are feasible. is case is depicted in Figure (b) . Now, assume that from ( , , , ) the strategy continues only with . probability (i.e., acont = . ). In this case path(S ) is equal to . -one path via ( , , , ), and half a path via ( , , , ). is case is depicted in Figure (c) .
In fact, path(S) can be computed recursively. Continuing with our example, observe that the number of ways of getting to S , i.e., path(S ), is equal to the sum of the number of ways of reaching S via S = ( , , , ), which we denote pathcont(S ), and the number of ways of reaching S via S = ( , , , ), which we denote pathcont(S ). If, for instance, acont(S ) = , that is, the strategy always terminates at S , then, the former number (i.e., pathcont(S )) is . If, on the other hand, acont(S ) = . , that is, with probability half, the strategy asks an additional question at S , then the former number pathcont(S ) = . × path(S ), i.e., the number of paths leaving S is half the number of paths reaching S (alternatively, half the number of ways to reach S ). Solution Details: We now present the details. From each state S, the incoming paths, path(S), ow onward to other states in the following manner: pathpass(S) is the fraction of paths that stop at S with the strategy returning Pass; path f ai l (S) is the fraction of paths that stop at S with the strategy returning Fail; and pathcont(S) is the fraction of paths that continue onward to other states.
We therefore have: at is, apass and a f ai l alternatively represent the fraction of the path at a state that is lost by returning a Pass or Fail decision respectively. e remaining (fractional) number of paths, pathcont, continue onward to other states. Via conservation of paths, we have:
In other words, path ow can come to a state by asking any one of the r workers and getting one of the two possible answers (YES/NO). It can be shown that the rest of the variables are linear equalities on the path variables. For some constants const(S), const ′ (S) (independent of the strategy and only dependent on S) we have:
e proofs use induction, and can be found in the extended tech-
us, we have linear equations relating all the variables of interest, along with corner cases: Note that our techniques are easily adapted to the somewhat simpler setting when there are di erent worker classes, each with an in nite number of workers. In this setting, there are r classes of workers with error rates e (wi ), e (wi ), i ∈ . . . r, such that there are innitely many workers in each class (and each worker in a given class has the same error rate). Here, even a er receiving an answer from a worker in one class, we may still get additional (possibly di erent) answers from workers in the same class (with the same error rate). We return to this simpler setting in the posterior-based representation section (Section ). Discussion: e astute reader may have noticed that the complexity, especially when r is large, can be rather high, due to r being present in the exponent of the complexity expression. erefore, the linear programming approach will not scale if r is large. Instead, we will need to resort to an approximate approach, presented in Section .
Incorporating Prior Information
We now generalize our algorithms for when we have prior information about items. Modi ed Setting: Instead of having a single prior probability or selectivity s for all items, we now have prior probabilities si for each item i, representing the probability of the item satisfying the lter. We let s ′ , s ′ , . . . , s ′ l be the distinct set of prior probabilities. e number l may be typically much smaller than n, the total number of items. For instance, if
Solution: Our algorithm will e ectively design a distinct strategy for each distinct probability s ′ j . We characterize the new state space as: (x , y , . . . , xr , yr , j), j ∈ . . . l. e last coordinate in this state space encodes the a-priori probability of the item we operate on.
Each item with priori probability si = s ′ j will then begin ltering at state ( , . . . , , j), i.e., the start state for the strategy corresponding to s ′ j . On asking a question and getting an answer from a worker, we transition from (x , y , . . . , xr , yr , j) to (x , y , . . . , xi + , yi , . . . , xr , yr , j) or (x , y , . . . , xi , yi + , . . . , xr , yr , j) -that is, the last coordinate remains xed, while one of the other coordinates is incremented based on the given worker answer. When computing the strategies in the previous section, we had set p ( , , . . . , ) = − s. Here, we have a di erent probability p depending on the last coordinate. We have,
e probability above is a product of two factors: e rst factor is the fraction of items that begin at ( , . . . , , j), i.e., the probability that any item has prior probability s ′ j . e second factor is the probability that an item does not satisfy the lter, given that it begins processing at ( , . . . , , j)-i.e., ( − s ′ j ) Note that by adding another index to our state space, we are e ectively constructing one strategy for each s ′ j : intuitively, for s ′ j close to or , we expect the strategies to be "small" (i.e., have a small number of reachable states), while for s ′ j close to . , the strategy may be larger, since that case is more uncertain.
Given these modi cations, once again, the path ow property can be leveraged to derive a linear program, giving us:
T . (P +P ). We can nd the optimal strategy for Problem with priors in O(m r rl . log(ml) + m r l), where l is the number of distinct si .
e proof of complexity is a straightforward extension of the argument in the previous section. Discussion: Notice that even if r = , l can be as large as n (the total number of items), and as a result, this approach can be rather inefcient when l is large. In particular, the ne-grained probabilities output by machine learning algorithms may give us many distinct prior probabilities. Instead, we will need to resort to an approximate approach, presented in the next section.
Note also that prior information may not always be completely accurate for individual items. However, we do expect that over all items, the statistics may indeed be correct, and in such a case, our guarantees still continue to hold.
POSTERIOR-BASED REPRESENTATION
We now describe the posterior-based representation. is representation, unlike the previous representation, is approximate, that is, the representation does not comprise a complete record of the state of processing of an item-some information is lost. However, our technique exposes a knob that allows the calling application to control the amount of lost information (at the cost of added computational complexity): as the amount of information recorded is increased, the cost of the output strategy tends towards reaching optimal cost. In addition, unlike the answer-record representation whose state space scales rapidly (with some parameter dependent on the aspect under consideration), the dimensionality of the posteriorbased representation stays constant on adding additional aspects.
We rst describe the representation for the basic setting considered in CrowdScreen-when all workers are assumed to be equally error-prone. Considering the basic setting allows us to demonstrate, for a simple case, how the states in the answer-record representation, discussed previously, map to those the posterior-based representation. en, in the next subsection, we will provide our solution for worker abilities (that we considered in Section . ), and then for incorporating prior information (that we considered in Section . ).
Basic Setting
Preliminaries: In the basic setting, when all workers have identical error rates, the answer-record representation has a collection of states S represented using a pair (x, y), where x is the total number of YES answers so far, while y is the total number of NO answers so far, as shown in Figure ( le ). e gure shows a strategy that has a Cont decision (Yellow) for all states (x, y) such that x + y ≤ , with Pass (blue) for ( , ) and ( , ), and Fail (red) for ( , ), and ( , ).
Instead, the posterior-based representation has a new state space represented using two components (p, c), encoding a probability p, which represents the probability that an item has V = given the answers obtained so far, denoted: p = Pr[V = (x, y)] and cost c, which represents the total cost incurred so far, i.e., (x + y).
As in the answer-record representation, in this representation, a strategy takes as input a state (p, c), and outputs a probabilistic decision: "Fail", "Pass", or "Continue". Mapping and Optimality: We show the correspondence by mapping states in the strategy in the answer-record (le ) representation to the posterior-based (middle) representation.
e mapping is shown in Figure for s = . , e = e = . with dashed lines for three states (other mappings are omitted for clarity).
As can be seen in the gure, the state ( , ) maps to precisely (s, ) = ( . , ), since Pr[V = ( , )] = s = . , and since x + y = + = .
e state ( , ) maps to precisely ( . , ) since Pr[V = ( , )] = s e s e +( −s)( −e ) = . , and since x + y = + = , while state ( , ) maps to precisely ( . , ) since Pr[V = ( , )] = . , and since x + y = + = .
us, each state (x, y) (in the le in the gure) maps to precisely one state in the new representation (in the middle in the gure). It is also easy to see that each state in the new representation can correspond to at most one state (x, y). To see this, let there be two distinct states (x ′ , y ′ ) and (x, y) in the answer-record representation that map to the same state in the posterior-based representation. us, x ′ + y ′ = x + y. Now, without loss of generality, let x ′ < x. en, we can show that the p value associated with (x ′ , y ′ ) must be smaller (since there are fewer YES answers from workers with the same error rates). us, strategies in the answer-record representation may be represented in the posterior-based representation without loss in information.
Furthermore, there are no better strategies in the posterior-based representation, that is, the best strategy in the posterior-based representation is no better than the best strategy in the answer-record representation. is is because the only states in the posterior-based representation that matter are the ones that are reachable in any answer-record strategy; those are precisely the ones that have a corresponding state in the answer-record representation. us:
For the basic setting (with all workers having identical error rates), the optimal strategy for Problem in the posterior-based representation would have same expected monetary cost as the optimal strategy in the answer-record representation. Approximation: e theorem above states that the optimal strategy in the posterior-based representation would have same expected cost as the optimal strategy in the answer-record representation. Instead of storing the set of reachable states and computing a strategy using those states, we instead compute strategies on an approximate discretized version of the entire posterior-based representation states; when we consider worker abilities, approximations will become more necessary. As we will see in Section , even our approximate solutions have very good performance (i.e., very low cost for same error threshold).
In particular, we approximate the state (p, c) by using discretization. We discretize the probability p into intervals. (Note that c is already discrete.) We use a discretization factor δ, and we divide the
e larger the discretization factor δ, the smaller will be our intervals, and our intervals will be more in number.
Our state space S is now restricted to (p, c) where p is an integer multiple of δ.
e discretized state space is depicted in Figure (Right) for δ = . As can be seen in the gure, the two blue states in the full posterior-based representation (middle) map to the same state in the approximate posterior-based representation (right); there are in nitely many mappings from states in the full posterior-based representation to the approximate discrete one, but we omit them from the gure for clarity. For instance, any (p, c), where a δ ≤ p ≤ (a + ) δ, where a is an integer, maps to (a δ, c). Now, if on getting an answer ans for a question asked when at state (p, c), (where p is an integer multiple of δ), our updated posterior probability value is p ′ , we round p ′ up to p ′′ , the nearest integer multiple of δ, and the new state will be (p ′′ , c + ).
Approximate Solution: Now that we have a discrete set of states, we can once again use path-based reasoning, and linear programming on paths to nd the best strategy, as in the answer-record representation. We now brie y describe how path-based reasoning works in this case: e value path(p, c) is the sum of pathcont from all (p ′ , c − ) such that receiving either a YES or a NO answer from any worker leads to the point (p, c). Essentially, we can de ne a recurrence expression that allows us to compute path(p, c) in a manner similar to Equation .
We therefore have the following theorem, using a straightforward extension of the complexity argument of eorem . : T . . We can nd a strategy using the approximate posterior-based representation for a variant of Problem with all workers having identical error rates, in O(δ . m . log(mδ)), where δ is the discretization factor.
us, by adjusting δ, the user can control how much time they are willing to invest in nding a strategy. e more they invest, the lower the monetary cost of the strategy will be, as we will see next. Convergence: As we saw in Figure , multiple states in the answerrecord representation may map to the same state in the approximate posterior-based representation. For example, the two blue states in the answer-record representation (le ) map to two separate states in the full posterior-based representation (middle), both of which map to a single discrete blue state in the approximate posterior-based representation (right). However, as we increase the discretization factor (and therefore the number of intervals), the likelihood that multiple states in the answer-record representation will map to the same discrete state in the approximate posterior-based representation will go down; as a result, the cost of the optimal strategy in the approximate discrete posterior-based representation tends towards optimal cost. Formally,
. As δ → ∞, the cost of the optimal strategy in the approximate posterior-based representation will tend to the cost of the optimal strategy in the answer-based representation.
Discussion:
In this subsection, we demonstrated that even though the strategies computed using the approximate posterior-based representation do not achieve the same low monetary cost of the exact answer-record representation, we can get as close as we want to that cost by varying the user-controlled discretization factor δ.
is guarantee seems to not be that useful for the basic setting with an in nite pool of identical workers, where the answer-record representation leads to a tractable solution. However, we will nd that similar guarantees hold for the aspects considered next. While tractable solutions are not possible for those aspects using the answerrecord representation, they are indeed possible with the posteriorbased representation.
Worker Abilities
Recall that in Section . , for the answer-record representation, we found that representing the answers from each worker individually led to an explosion in the state space. In this section, we describe how we may leverage the posterior-based representation when we have worker abilities without a similar explosion.
Also in Section . , we had brie y mentioned that our techniques would directly apply to the simpler setting of in nite worker classes, where instead of having r distinct workers, we had r in nite worker classes, with each class having a distinct error rate. e key di erence is that if one of the r workers answers a question on an item, that worker will not be asked from that point on; while in the r innite worker classes case, the same worker class may be used multiple times on the same item.
Here, we revisit that setting rst: our guarantees for asymptotic optimality only hold for the simpler setting of r worker classes, and do not hold for the setting of r distinct workers. We will return to this point once we nish our treatment of r worker classes.
We begin by describing the changes in representation that apply to the entire section. We then discuss the in nite worker classes case (along with the associated optimality guarantees), and the r distinct workers case. Changes in Representation: Unlike in the answer-record representation, where we had r coordinates in the representation corresponding to the r workers, here, the posterior-based representation continues to use two coordinates (p, c). us, the size of the posterior-based state space does not change when we have many workers with di erent abilities -but, as we will see later, the cost of computing the strategy does change. In nite Worker Classes: We rst consider the full posterior-based representation before discretization, and then discuss discretization. Recall that in the in nite worker classes case, instead of having r workers with di erent abilities, we have r in nite worker classes.
at is, there are r classes of workers, such that, at any state, with probability r, our question is answered by a worker with error rate e (w ), e (w ), with probability r, by a worker with error rate e (w ), e (w ), and so on.
ese classes are in nite; that is, if we sample a worker from class , the probability of getting a worker from class does not change in the future. In this scenario, the answer-record representation is the same S = (x , y , . . . , xr , yr): but with one di erence; in the previous setting, at most one of xi or yi is ; here xi or yi can both be as large as m (because there may be as many as m YES or NO answers from a given worker classrecall that our cost bound per item is m.)
We state the following lemma without proof. 
.
• e probability of getting a YES or a NO from a speci c worker class at s , . . . , sa, given that a question is asked, is identical for each of s , . . . , sa.
We can now state the following theorem:
With innite worker classes, the optimal strategy for Problem in the full posterior-based representation has the same cost as the optimal strategy in the answer-record representation.
e proof of the above theorem is not as straightforward as the proof of eorem . , where we could simply show a one-to-one correspondence between states in the answer-record and posterior-based representations. e proof may be found in the extended technical report [ ]. Furthermore, we have:
. For in nite worker classes, as δ → ∞, the cost of the optimal strategy in the approximate posterior-based representation will tend to the cost of the optimal strategy in the full posterior-based representation.
Approximation to Worker Abilities:
While we have proved optimality for the posterior-based representation for in nite worker classes, the proof does not capture the worker abilities aspect discussed in Section . precisely, because as soon as a worker answers a question (with a YES/NO), the worker can no longer be asked any further questions. erefore, even as δ increases without bound, by representing the state using just two numbers p and c, we are certainly losing information if we do not record exactly which worker gave us which answer (like we do in the answer record representation). us, our solution will be necessarily approximate.
We now further approximate via discretization (as discussed in the previous section). erefore, in adapting to r distinct workers, there are two sources of approximation: one, from discretization (like we saw in the previous section), and second, from using the r in nite worker classes approach for the r distinct worker case.
However, as we will see in the experiments in Section , the two approximations we have made do not hurt performance. We have the following, a straightforward extension of the complexity argument of eorem . : T . . We can nd a posterior-based strategy for the Problem with worker abilities provided, in O(m . δ . log(mrδ)+ mδr), where δ is the discretization factor.
Notice that r appears as a logarithmic factor in rst term of the complexity.
is is because the linear equations in the linear program scale up by O(r) -we need to consider transitions from each state (p, c) based on r possible answers: YES/NO from each worker. Since the complexity is no longer exponential in r, it is much faster to compute the optimal strategy in the approximate posterior based representation than it is in the answer-record representation.
Incorporating Prior Information
We now consider the aspect described in Section . . Recall that our approach for the answer-record representation was to have a strategy computed for each individual distinct prior probability s ′ j value as provided by an automated algorithm or human. is number could be as large as O(n), where n is the number of items. As a result, our solution, even when the number of workers or worker classes is small, ended up being di cult to compute.
We now discuss how we may leverage the posterior-based representation S = (p, c) for this aspect. We discuss our solution for the basic setting, that is, when all workers are identical, though our technique is generalizable to when we have distinct worker abilities.
e key idea that we use is to set the path ow into (s ′ j , ) to be equal to f rac(s ′ j ), i.e., the fraction of items with prior probability s ′ j . us, the total path ow into all states with cost c = is still , as before. For instance, if we had of the items with prior probability . , and the remaining with prior probability . , then we would start half a path at ( . , ), and half a path at ( . , ).
With the full posterior-based representation, the optimal strategy has just as low cost as the answer-record representation, formalized in the theorem below:
. With s , s , . . . , sn provided, the optimal strategy in the posterior-based representation for Problem (with identical workers) has the same cost as the optimal strategy in the answer-record representation.
We will now discretize the probability p, as before. As we increase the discretization factor δ, the cost of the optimal strategy in the discretized posterior-based representation will tend to the cost of the optimal strategy in the full posterior-based representation.
T . (A O P ). As δ → ∞, with priors, the cost of the optimal strategy for Problem (with identical workers) in the approximate posterior-based representation will tend to the cost of the optimal strategy in the answer-record representation.
We then have:
. We can nd a posterior-based strategy for Problem with prior probabilities provided, in O(δ . m . log(ml δ)+lmδ), where δ is the discretization factor.
us, unlike the answer-record representation, this representation does not have a computationally expensive O(n . ) factor.
OTHER ASPECTS
We now discuss other aspects described in the introduction. All these aspects can be captured by the two representations discussed previously.
• Latent Di culty: e algorithms in CrowdScreen assume that all items are equally hard or equally easy to lter-that is, they assume that all humans have the same error rate on every item. However, this assumption may not hold in practice. As an example, checking if a blurry picture contains a cat is much harder to do (and is more error-prone) than a clear picture. Furthermore, difculty information is not provided to us up-front; we need to infer if an item is di cult or not based on answers we get from humans.
• Requesting Speci c Workers: e algorithms in CrowdScreen do not request that speci c workers answer, nor pay workers di erently. In the marketplace ODesk [ ], for instance, there are better quali ed workers who are paid more while not-so well quali ed workers who are paid less, and for any question, we may choose to use a more quali ed or less quali ed worker. Here, we consider the addition of the functionality of being able to request that speci c workers answer and being able to pay them di erent amounts.
• Latency: e problem statements described so far only have monetary cost and error as objectives, not latency. Latency is important in many crowdsourcing applications. We consider the addition of a simple latency constraint in our problem statement.
• Scoring: e problem statements described so far only consider binary ltering: we would also like to perform scoring, i.e., identifying the appropriate score or rating of an item, say from . . . . Furthermore, we allow weighted error objectives. For instance, it is much worse to score an item with true rating , as a , instead of a . Brie y, scoring is handled by increasing the dimensionality of states by recording if a worker gave an item a score of , , . . . , r. Our solution for all of these aspects can be found in our technical report [ ]. In Table , we show the complexity results for each of the aspects considered; the two columns correspond to the complexity of algorithm computing the strategy using the answer-record representation, and the complexity of the algorithm computing the strategy using the posterior-based representation.
We divide the rows into two parts: the complexity on adding each of the individual improvement-based aspects to the setting with worker abilities, followed by the complexity on adding each of the functionality addition-based aspects to the setting with worker abilities.
PEER EVALUATION EXPERIMENTS
We describe the dataset and the setting rst, followed by our experimental methodology. Dataset Description: We validate our algorithms on a real MOOC course dataset-the Human Computer Interaction (HCI) course offered during Fall at Stanford. e HCI course involved around students, who were evaluated on ve assignments, each containing ve problems, for a total of problems. us, the total number of student submissions (across all problems) was , . e course relied entirely on evaluation by peer graders to judge the quality of the student submissions for each problem. Each submission was graded independently by (randomly selected) student graders on average, each grader providing a score between -, both inclusive, i.e., one of six scores. us, the total number of evaluations (i.e., questions asked to humans) across all submissions was , , with each grader grading , / = items on average.
is dataset is ordered, that is, for every submission, the scores provided by the ten graders are listed in the order in which they were received. For each score assigned to a submission, the identity of the grader who provided the score is also recorded as part of the dataset. Mapping to Filtering: We treat each student submission on a problem as an item to be scored on a scale from -(both inclusive).
us, we are operating under the scoring scenario described in Section , instead of ltering items as being YES/NO. Since there are problems, each evaluated by students, we have a total of , items to be scored. Grader Evaluation: e dataset also contains a set of "test" submissions that were graded by all graders, as well as the course sta (instructors or TAs).
ese test submissions allows the peer evaluation system to calibrate the error rates of each grader prior to peer evaluation.
Since we are scoring items rather than performing binary ltering, the error rates or accuracies for each grader (or worker) w k are of the form p (i , j) (w k ), representing the probability that a worker w k examines an item with sta score j, and assigns it a score of i. Since we have possible scores, each grader's error rate is therefore dened by a set of p (i , j) values. We set the grader's error rate based on his or her performance on the test submissions. Our estimate of p (i , j) (w k ) is simply: the fraction of items whose sta scores are j that the worker w k judged to be i instead, over the total number of items with a sta score of j. Complete Maximum Likelihood Score: In our evaluations we will need to compare the score provided by a strategy to the submission's "correct" score. Since we do not have TA scores (except for the test submissions), we will interpret the "correct score" as the best possible estimate if we had available all information.
us we de ne the complete maximum likelihood score for an item a as the score j ∈ . . . that the item is most likely to be, based on all existing information about a (that is, all grader evaluations of a). We assume that graders evaluate items with known accuracies corresponding to p (i , j) . We de ne this concept more formally below.
We de ne L( j, a), j ∈ . . . to be the probability that the score of item a is j, given the evidence we have. at is,
erefore, L( j, a) encodes the product of the probabilities p (i , j) for all workers who looked at the item, and gave it a score of i, for some i. For instance, if worker w gave an item a a score of , and worker w gave a a score of , then: L( j, a) = p ( , j) (w ) ⋅ p ( , j) (w ). Now, the complete maximum likelihood score of an item a, V (a) is de ned as the score j that maximizes L( j, a):
us, the complete maximum likelihood score of an item is the score that maximizes the product of the probabilities of the individual grader scores, across all graders who have provided scores for the item. As a result, we use the entire dataset to assign a score to each item. Note that we are overloading V to mean both the "true value" of items (as de ned in Section ), and the complete maximum likelihood score: this is because for all practical purposes, the complete maximum likelihood score is our best estimate of the true value of items given the entire dataset. Overall Goal and Methodology: e goal of our experiments is to study the trade-o between expected cost and expected error for the ltering strategies output by our algorithms. Our methodology for comparison is to repeat the following for each algorithm:
• For each error threshold τ ∈ [ , ], we execute the algorithm to generate a ltering strategy that obeys the expected error threshold, and is optimized for minimum expected cost.
• We then simulate a run of the generated ltering strategy on each item (i.e., each student submission) in the dataset. When the ltering strategy requests an additional grader score while processing an item, then this score as well as the identity of the grader who provided the score is retrieved from the dataset. at is, when the ltering strategy requests an additional grader score, it is allowed to "see" another score for the item from the dataset (in the order in which the scores were assigned by graders in the rst place).
• When the simulation of the strategy on each item terminates, we record both the empirical cost (the number of scores requested for that item), and the empirical error (the di erence between the complete maximum likelihood score-as assigned above-and the score output by the strategy for the item).
• We then measure the average empirical cost (i.e., total number of scores requested by the strategy, as a fraction of the total number of scores available in the dataset across all items), and the average empirical error (i.e., the average di erence between the score assigned to an item and its complete maximum likelihood score, across all items).
• We repeat the procedure above for a range of τ, recording the average empirical cost and error, giving us a cost-error curve. ese cost-error curves allow us to pictorially compare between algorithms over a range of cost and error values. Algorithms: We evaluate four ltering algorithms. For all algorithms that we study, we use the posterior-based representation (as described in Section ), wherein the state of processing is recorded using two quantities: the probability p that the item passes the lter, given answers seen so far, and cost spent so far, c. Since we wish to score items from . . . , instead of performing binary ltering, the probability p is replaced with probabilities p , p , . . . , p , i.e., the probability that the item has score i, i ∈ . . . , given the grader ) . u log(mrδ) + mδ u− r Table : Comparison of complexity: For clarity, we only show the complexity of adding one aspect at a time to the setting of Problem ; it is straightforward to construct the solution for applying all the aspects at the same time. Notation: m is the upper-bound on cost, r is the number of workers, δ is the discretization factor, d is the number of distinct error rates, l is the number of distinct probabilities, t is the upper-bound on latency, and u is the number of distinct scores.
evaluations seen so far. ( e probability p that the item has score given the scores seen so far can be inferred from the remaining values, and therefore need not be recorded.) Since we use the posteriorbased representation, all the algorithms we study have a discretization factor δ, representing the number of intervals into which we divide the probability coordinate. As we saw in Section , the larger the δ, the more ne-grained our probability estimates are, but the more time it takes to compute the strategy. e algorithms we consider are the following: • Single(δ): is algorithm, for each threshold τ, generates the costoptimal strategy assuming all workers have the same error rate, using techniques from CrowdScreen.
• Complete(δ): is more powerful algorithm, for each threshold τ, generates the cost-optimal strategy assuming worker abilities are all distinct, using techniques from Section . . • Var(k, δ): We de ne variance as the average di erence between the scores provided by the grader and sta scores, as observed during testing (described above). is algorithm, for each value k, rst places graders into k equal-sized intervals based on their variance: that is, graders are sorted based on their variance, and then we partition variance into k intervals such that the same number of graders are in each interval. is algorithm, for each error threshold τ, generates the cost-optimal strategy, assuming that workers within each partition have the same error rate. at is, workers in an partition are assumed to be equally capable of evaluating items. When k = , i.e., equal to the total number of graders, then this algorithm is identical to the Complete algorithm, since in that case, each grader will be in a partition all by himself or herself. Additionally, when k = , then this algorithm is identical to the Single algorithm, since in that case all graders will be in the same partition. us, this algorithm can be viewed as a generalization of both Single and Complete, as is the Bias algorithm described next.
• Bias(k, δ): is algorithm is the same as the previous one, except we partition graders based on bias; we de ne bias as the average signed di erence between the scores provided by the grader and sta scores, as observed during the testing period. We compare the algorithms above to the following two baselines:
• Median: is heuristic is currently in use in the Coursera system for peer evaluation. For each submission, the scores given by the randomly selected student graders are combined using the median heuristic: that is, the median of the scores for each submission is the nal grade assigned to the submission. We can generate a cost-error curve for the median algorithm by constraining the cost to be some fraction γ of the maximum possible cost-that is, with probability γ, we include each score assigned to an item while computing the median-and then we measure the error of the median scores assigned (i.e., the di erence between the median score and the complete maximum likelihood score, on average across all items). We repeat this for multiple γ to give us a cost-error curve.
• RMLE (Randomized Maximum Likelihood Estimation): For each submission, this algorithm combines the scores given by randomly selected graders, using maximum likelihood, that is, the nal grade assigned to the submission is the maximum likelihood estimate computed using the set of scores seen so far. As in the Median algorithm, we generate a cost-error curve by constraining the cost to be some fraction γ of the maximum possible cost-that is, with probability γ, we include each score assigned to an item-and then we measure the error of the score assigned by the RMLE algorithm. We repeat this for multiple γ to give us a cost-error curve. We implemented all of our algorithms in Python and conducted our experiments on a large memory ( GB) processor server. We report some statistics on the dataset, including distribution of grader load, bias and variance of grader evaluations, and impact of question on grader accuracy, all in our technical report [ ]. Experiment : How much bene t do we get from optimized crowdpowered algorithms as compared to simple heuristics, and how much bene t do we get from considering worker abilities?
On comparing Single, Complete, RMLE, and Median on cost and error, we nd that for the same error, Complete has signi cantly lower cost than Single and RMLE, which has signicantly lower cost than Median. Additionally, on xing cost, we nd that Complete has signi cantly lower error than Single and RMLE, both of which have signi cantly lower cost than Median. For most costs, Complete has of the error of Single and RMLE, and the error of Median.
We use the methodology described above to trace the cost-error curve for Single, Complete (both for δ = ) -denoted SingleFactor and Complete-Factor respectively, RMLE, and Median. e results are displayed in Figure (a) . e gure shows the fraction of the dataset that is "seen" or "consumed" by each of the algorithms (i.e., the total empirical cost) on the y-axis, versus the average difference between the complete maximum likelihood score and the estimated score (i.e., the average empirical error) on the x-axis. As can be seen in the gure, Complete has much lower cost and error than Single, RMLE, and Median. For instance, on xing cost, say at , which means that each of the algorithms requests scores on average for each submission, Median has an error of . , i.e., on average, the actual score assigned to a student is . away from the complete maximum likelihood score; Single and RMLE have an error of . , of the error of Median; Complete, on the other hand, has an error of . , just of the error of Median, and just the error of Single or RMLE. (Of course, the better performing algorithms have a higher computational cost, as will be discussed in Experiment .)
In Figure (b) , we trace the cost-error curve for Single (for δ = ), RMLE, and Median. Here, we nd that unlike when δ = (where Single and RMLE performed similarly), Single itself has much lower cost and error than RMLE and Median. For instance, on xing cost at , Median has an error of . and RMLE has an error of . , while Single has an error of around . (i.e., just of the error of RMLE, and of the error of Median.) us, the optimized crowd-powered algorithms-Complete and Single-provide signi cant bene ts in both cost and error over the algorithm currently used in the peer evaluation system (Median), as well as RMLE. is is because these algorithms nd strategies that are optimized to make the right decision at every possible interme- diate state of processing. Further, we nd that Complete does much better than Single; thus there are signi cant bene ts to tracking individual grader abilities rather than assuming that all graders have the same error rate. Since Complete takes into account individual grader abilities, it can appropriately "weigh" di erently the same answer coming from two di erent graders with di erent abilities. e algorithm Single, on the other hand, is not able to take this information into account. Both Complete and Single do better than RMLE, because they are able to request more evaluations for the more problematic or controversial items. over others. RMLE, on the other hand, requests the same amount of evaluations on average for all items. While Single does not do much better than RMLE for δ = , it does much better for δ = , indicating that the discretization factor can have a signi cant impact on cost and error. We explore this aspect subsequently. Experiment : How much does taking worker abilities into account impact performance? at is, how ne-grained should our worker ability partitions be?
On keeping δ xed, increasing the number of worker partitions has the e ect of reducing error for xed cost, or vice versa. However, the impact of the number of partitions is more pronounced early on (for a small number of partitions), than later on, when the number of partitions is already large. us, increasing the number of partitions yields signi cant savings in cost even though it leads to higher computational cost while computing the strategy.
We next study how our hybrid algorithm for Variance performs in comparison with Single and Complete, on varying k, the number of worker partitions. We x the discretization factor to be δ, and vary the number of partitions from (i.e., Single), to , , and then nally to (i.e., Complete). Figure ( c) depicts the cost-error curves for each of these four algorithms (the Variance curves are denoted Var-Class-k-Factor in the gure.) As can be seen in the gure, there are signi cant gains to be had in terms of cost and error in increasing the number of grader partitions from to , from to , and from to . For instance, if we x the error to be around . , Complete gives us a cost of , Var-Class -Factor (i.e., Variance with k = ) has a cost of around , Var-ClassFactor (i.e., Variance with k = ) has a cost of around , and Single has a cost of around . As can be also seen in the gure, small changes in k are more likely to impact the cost-error curve when k is small, rather than when k is already large: for instance, the impact of changing k from to is as pronounced as the impact of changing k from to . us, if the computing the strategy is feasible for large k, this gure shows that it is preferable to do so in order to take advantage of the additional cost savings to be had on increasing k. We consider the computational cost on varying k later on.
Experiment : How nely should we discretize probabilities?
On keeping k xed at , increasing the discretization factor has a signi cant impact on performance: that is, it has the e ect of reducing error for xed cost, or vice versa. us, increasing the discretization factor yields signi cant savings in monetary cost even though it leads to higher computational cost while computing the strategy.
For this experiment, we x k = , and let δ be , , , or .
( ese values of δ were chosen because each of these values are divisors of the number .) We then plot the cost-error curves for Variance for these values of δ in Figure (a) , and for Bias for these values of δ in Figure (b) . As can be seen in the gure, the cost-error curves for δ = or are not as smooth as the ones for δ = or : this is because when the probability discretization is so coarsegrained, then there is a lot more noise, and the trade-o between cost and error is less predictable.
Further, as we can see here, as we increase δ, there are signi cant gains in both cost and error. For instance, in Figure (a) , for error being equal to . the cost for δ = is , while the cost for δ = is , an almost increase. e cost-error curves for or never manage to achieve error . . us, these set of results dictate that we should use as high a δ as possible, to pro t from the gains in both monetary cost and error. However, increasing δ leads to much higher computational and storage cost. In fact, in our experiments, we were not able to compute the strategy for δ = : this is because even storing the strategy (in a memoized form) would require an array of × × × ≈ Billion entries, which is more than we could manage on our Ubuntu server. We will study this aspect in more detail later.
Experiment : How should we partition graders?
Partitioning graders on bias or variance gives similar results.
In Figure (c) , we study the di erence between using Bias or Variance to partition graders. We let k = , and plot the cost-error curves for both Bias and Variance for δ = and . As can be seen in the gure, Bias and Variance perform similarly: while it seems like Variance is better for higher δ and Bias is better for lower δ, these changes may be attributed to experimental noise, rather than to some systematic variation. Overall, using Bias to partition graders is just as good as using Variance. Experiment : How does the computational cost of computing a strategy vary with k or δ?
e cost of computing a strategy grows linearly with k and polynomially with δ.
We focus on the Variance worker partition scheme, and plot the cost of computing the strategy in minutes versus δ for di erent values of k: (same as Single), , and , shown in Figure Figure (a) , but with the y-axis in log scale). As you can see in Figure ( a), the time to compute the strategy increases very rapidly with δ: for instance, for k = , the time varies from less than minutes for δ = , to three hours for δ = , to half a day for δ = . e growth curve is convex (i.e., the rate of change increases as we increase δ) for each of the three plots corresponding to di erent k. In our analysis of the posterior-based representation for the multiple scores case in the technical report [ ], we showed that the complexity of representing the strategy itself (and computing it) is proportional to a large polynomial of δ, thus the experimental results con rm the theoretical analysis.
In Figure ( b), the trend on increasing k is clear: for each value of δ, the di erence between the log of the computation time for k = and is the same as the di erence between that for k = and (for all δ).
us, (a) the ratio between the time to compute strategies is proportional to the ratio of k values (b) this ratio is the same independent of δ. us, as predicted by theoretical analysis, the time to compute the strategy is linearly proportional to k.
us, the cost of computing strategies increases polynomially with δ and linearly with k. On the other hand, the cost of storing strategies increases polynomially with δ, but is not dependent on k. Experiment : Should we increase k or δ?
Both k and δ a ect cost and error signi cantly; however, it may be preferable to increase k rst, since it increases the complexity linearly rather than polynomially (as in the case of δ).
We focus on the Variance worker partition scheme, and consider two values each of k and δ: k = , , and δ = , : we plot the cost-error curves for these four algorithms in Figure (c) . We nd that the two curves for δ = , and the two curves for δ = perform similarly, with the curve for k = performing better than the curve for k = in both cases. However, the curves for δ = perform worse than δ = .
us, δ has a larger impact on cost and error than k. is impact comes at a price: the computational complexity is proportional to a large polynomial of δ, while being linearly proportional to k. And since the number of k values is not likely to be very large (in the hundreds or thousands, rather than the millions), it may be preferable to increase k rst before δ.
RELATED WORK

Crowd Algorithms:
ere is plenty of recent work on designing data processing algorithms that use humans as data processing units [ , , , , , , , , , , , ] . Of these, the only paper focusing on ltering is CrowdScreen [ ], which we compare against in this paper. e work by Karger et al. [ ] also considers ltering, but instead of optimizing for an explicit objective, tries to minimize worst case error (a di erent, weaker objective than ours). As a result, their algorithm never obtain any (asymptotic) improvements from using an online scheme that asks questions based on the answers obtained thus far. Furthermore, Karger et al. assume that the same worker will never be asked again. In our case, the same set of students will be asked to answer many questions. EM-Based Worker Quality Estimation: ere are a number of papers that use the Expectation Maximization algorithm to estimate worker quality, and in the process, estimate the true answers for various tasks [ , , , , , , ] . ese algorithms collect annotations from humans, and does disagreement-based analysis a er the fact to deduce the true answers. Our algorithms could certainly bene t from using some of these techniques to better assess the quality of the work provided by workers before designing strategies, perhaps combining them with multi-armed bandit schemes [ ].
Systems:
ere are many crowd-powered systems that have been developed over the last few years [ , , , , , , , , , , ] . Many of these systems require a quality control component, making sure that enough votes are gathered to ensure correctness. MDPs: Dan Weld's group has used POMDPs (Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes) to design crowd-powered work ows [ , , , ] . In particular, they model worker behavior, task di culty, and output quality to dynamically choose the decision to make at any step in the work ow (re ne, improve, vote, or stop), and also to dynamically switch between work ows to improve the overall "utility". Kamar et al. [ ] use POMDPs to study how to best utilize participation in voluntary crowdsourcing systems, speci cally, Galaxy Zoo, an astronomical data set veri ed by human workers.
Our ltering strategies also use decision theory, speci cally, MDPs (Markov Decision Processes); however, unlike the papers listed above, our models are simpler, enabling us to get guarantees for optimality for our ltering strategies, while performing exceptionally well in practice. e papers mentioned above do not provide theoretical guarantees of any kind. Lastly, these papers do not focus on ltering.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we described optimal ltering techniques that take into account a number of aspects found in real-world scenarios. We provided extensions of the strategy computation techniques in CrowdScreen [ ] that enable us to address all of these aspects, but lead to intractability in the representation and computation of the strategy for some aspects. We then developed the posterior-based representation which does not su er from the intractability issue in the answer-record representation, but leads to strategies that may not be optimal. We did, however, show that these strategies converge to optimal ones in the limit.
We then demonstrated the use of crowd-powered algorithms in a novel application: peer evaluation in MOOCs. Our algorithms provide signi cant reductions in both cost and error (as high as savings in cost, and improvement in accuracy) over schemes used in practice and intuitive baselines, as well as simpler CrowdScreen algorithms.
Even with a posterior-based representation, there may be significant computational costs in running the algorithm to derive the optimized strategy, as well as signi cant costs in representing and storing the optimized strategy. e computational costs are linearly dependent on k (the number of worker partitions based on ability) and polynomially dependent on δ (the strategy discretization factor). We demonstrated that there are signi cant bene ts to increasing the strategy parameters k and δ; we should increase both k and δ as much as the computational capability allows. Since k is likely to be no more than a few hundred or a few thousand in our peer evaluation system, we prefer to increase k rst, before δ. Of course, in other systems or other applications, we may wish to increase both k and δ simultaneously. 
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